Philosophia 44 (1):1-20 (2019)

Authors
Alex Fiorello
University of Ottawa
Abstract
Robert Kane’s libertarian theory of freedom is frequently attacked in the free will literature by the “luck objection”. Alfred Mele’s articulation of the objection is a very influential formulation as it captures the spirit of Kane’s critics and their complaint with Kane’s view. Mele argues that without a contrastive explanation that highlights aspects of the agent their free choices are reducible to luck. I argue that the lack of a contrastive explanation does not establish that there is no explanation for self-forming actions. Building on the explanation that Kane offers in his rebuttal, I claim that there are neglected dimensions to Kane’s view that, when put together, mitigate the force of the objection. These elements are value experiments, teleological intelligibility and liberum arbitrium voluntatis. I claim that through adopting a narrative view of the self, we can place value experiments in a broader teleological framework that allows us to see self-forming choices are not just a matter of luck.
Keywords Free Will  Narrative Views of the Self  Luck Objection  Robert Kane  Alfred Mele  Libertarianism about Free Will  Contrastive Expanations
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2019, 2020
DOI 10.1007/s11406-019-00065-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,132
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

After Virtue.A. MacIntyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
The Narrative Self.Marya Schechtman - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
In Defence of Narrative.Anthony Rudd - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):60-75.
I Could Not Have Done Otherwise-So What?Daniel C. Dennett - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (10):553-565.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.
Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):211-235.
Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.
Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane’s Libertarianism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
Libertarianism and Free Determined Decisions.John Lemos - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):675-688.
Kanian Freedom and the Problem of Luck.John Lemos - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):515-532.
Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐Type Examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-03-07

Total views
57 ( #188,730 of 2,454,694 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #226,106 of 2,454,694 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes