Passage, becoming and the nature of temporal reality

Philosophia 35 (1):1-21 (2007)
I first distinguish several notions that have traditionally been conflated (or otherwise neglected) in discussions of the metaphysics of time. Thus, for example, I distinguish between the passage of time and temporal becoming. The former is, I maintain, a confused notion that does not represent a feature of the world; whereas a proper understanding of the latter provides the key for a plausible and comprehensive account of the nature of temporal reality. There are two general classes of views of the nature of temporal reality; proponents of particular views in both classes attempt to account for the phenomenon of temporal becoming in terms of qualitative change. I argue that any such account – in terms of change – is irredeemably problematic. And so I propound a different account of temporal becoming, based on the notion that temporal reality is transient, which provides the means to characterize intuitively and vividly the significant effects of time on the metaphysical nature of the world.
Keywords Time  The metaphysics of time  Passage  Becoming
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-007-9052-1
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
D. H. Mellor (1981). Real Time. Cambridge University Press.

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