Structure, Intentionality and the Given

In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception: Proceedings of the 40th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 95-118 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The given is the state of a mind in its primary engagement with the world. A satisfactory epistemology—one, it turns out, that is foundationalist and includes a naïve realist view of perception—requires a certain account of the given. Moreover, knowledge based on the given requires both a particular view of the world itself and a heterodox account of judgment. These admittedly controversial claims are supported by basic ontological considerations. I begin, then, with two contradictory views of the world per se and the structure one experiences. I draw out the consequences of these two views for what intentionality is. The two views yield incompatible accounts of the given. The definitive spontaneity of the one account, and passivity of the other, can be understood in terms of the structure (or lack thereof) in the given. In defense of the claim that a structured given is not an apt epistemic basis, I examine an attempt to found an epistemology on such an account in light of the so-called myth of the given. I maintain that the given, if it is to provide some justification for taking the world to be a particular way, must be unstructured. To support this, I first discuss a significant problem with traditional foundationalism. I then argue that a satisfactory (foundationalist) epistemology requires the rejection of the orthodox propositional view of judgment in favor of a non-propositional, reistic view.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Brentano on Perception and Illusion.Guillaume Frechette - 2019 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception: Proceedings of the 40th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 119-134.
The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
Changes in View.Richard Manning - 2013 - ProtoSociology 30:124-151.
On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):497-514.
A Foundationalist Defense of the Given.Rachael J. Poulsen - 2004 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92 (1):173-196.
Skepticism and the Foundations of Empirical Justification.Ali Hasan - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Washington

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-04-29

Downloads
399 (#52,734)

6 months
113 (#41,713)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

M. Oreste Fiocco
University of California, Irvine

References found in this work

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.

View all 26 references / Add more references