Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77 (2010)
Some have concluded that the only appropriate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics is the view that familiar, concrete objects persist through time by perduring, that is, by having temporal parts. Many, including myself, believe this view of persistence is false, and so reject this conclusion. However, the most common attempts to resolve the problem and yet defend the view that familiar, concrete objects endure are self-defeating. This has heretofore gone unnoticed. I consider the most familiar such attempts, based on a strategy called tensing the copula , and present a general argument to demonstrate why this strategy – and any strategy based on relativization – fails. I then show how the considerations raised in this general argument undermine other attempts to resolve the problem while denying perdurance. All these attempts are undermined by an assumption essential to the problem of temporary intrinsics, to wit, that there are many moments of time and all have the same ontological status. As long as this assumption is maintained, the only solution to the problem is that familiar, concrete objects perdure. Thus, in order to defend the view that objects persist through time by enduring, one must adopt a different metaphysics of time (viz., presentism). I conclude that it is neither unreasonable nor impracticable to do so.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism.Kathrin Koslicki - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.
Scope Fallacies and the “Decisive Objection” Against Endurance.Lawrence B. Lombard - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (4):441-452.
The Lowe Road to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.Lawrence B. Lombard - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):163 - 185.
Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations Between Physical Objects and Times.Katherine Hawley - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216.
Three Arguments From Temporary Intrinsics.M. Eddon - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):605-619.
The Argument From Temporary Intrinsics.R. Wasserman - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419.
Added to index2010-03-02
Total downloads101 ( #49,718 of 2,164,542 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #347,995 of 2,164,542 )
How can I increase my downloads?