Austin and the argument from illusion

Philosophical Review 73 (July):372-382 (1964)

Abstract
Firth argues that austin's criticisms of the argument from illusion do not destroy the argument. We can reformulate it in two ways so that it succeeds as a method of ostensibly defining terms denoting the sensory constituent of perceptual experience. One way maintains the act-Object distinction of the cartesian tradition and the other uses the language of "looks." (staff)
Keywords Epistemology  Illusion  Judgment  Ostensive Definition  Perception  Seeing  Sensation  Sense Data  Austin
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DOI 10.2307/2183663
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O argumento da ilusão/alucinação e o disjuntivismo: Ayer versus Austin.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2015 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 12:85-106.

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