Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):286-306 (2003)
It is often thought that if a developing human being is considered a “person” from the beginning, then it would follow that abortion would be impermissible. For, after all, a person has a stringent right to life, and because life is a prerequisite for enjoying any other goods, it is plausible that the right to life is a “basic” or “fundamental” one, not easily overridden by other considerations. The right to life, it would seem, could not be outweighed by another individual's preferences, even preferences about what should happen in or to her body
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