Synthese 198 (2):1029-1070 (2019)

Authors
Joachim Horvath
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Eugen Fischer
University of East Anglia
Abstract
This paper provides new tools for philosophical argument analysis and fresh empirical foundations for ‘critical’ ordinary language philosophy. Language comprehension routinely involves stereotypical inferences with contextual defeaters. J.L. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia first mooted the idea that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from verbal case-descriptions drive some philosophical paradoxes; these engender philosophical problems that can be resolved by exposing the underlying fallacies. We build on psycholinguistic research on salience effects to explain when and why even perfectly competent speakers cannot help making stereotypical inferences which are contextually inappropriate. We analyse a classical paradox about perception, suggest it relies on contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance-verbs, and show that the conditions we identified as leading to contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are met in formulations of the paradox. Three experiments use a forced-choice plausibility-ranking task to document the predicted inappropriate inferences, in English, German, and Japanese. The cross-linguistic study allows us to assess the wider relevance of the proposed analysis. Our findings open up new perspectives for ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy.
Keywords experimental philosophy  ordinary language philosophy  salience effects  crosscultural psycholinguistics  naturalised argument analysis  argument from illusion  problem of perception  comprehension inferences  experimental pragmatics
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02081-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Attention and Effort.Daniel Kahneman - 1973 - Prentice-Hall.
Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 104 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Ideal Language Philosophy and Experiments on Intuitions.Sebastian Lutz - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):117-139.
Diagnostic Experimental Philosophy.Eugen Fischer & Paul E. Engelhardt - 2017 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):117-137.
Experimental Philosophy of Language.Nat Hansen - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Austin on Sense-Data: Ordinary Language Analysis as 'Therapy'.Eugen Fischer - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):67-99.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-01-07

Total views
275 ( #31,007 of 2,419,997 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #23,342 of 2,419,997 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes