Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):76-89 (2016)

Authors
Bob Fischer
Texas State University
Abstract
There are many modal epistemologies available to us. Which should we endorse? According to Bob Hale, we can start to answer this question by examining the architecture of modal knowledge. That is, we can try to decide between the following claims: knowing that p is possible is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that there are no conflicting necessities—a necessity-based approach—and knowing that p is necessary is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that there are no conflicting possibilities—a possibility-based approach. Hale argues for the first of these claims, but I contend that his arguments fail. However, it doesn't follow that we should endorse a possibility-based approach. I repurpose Hale's arguments to show those who would endorse possibility-based approaches need to say more about our modal knowledge concerning logic and mathematics; if they can't, then they ought to endorse a hybrid modal epistemology that doesn't give priority to one modality across the board. Additionally, those who endorse possibility-based views may be committed to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism
Keywords Bob Hale  modal epistemology  conceivability  modal skepticism
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12078
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.
Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance.George Bealer - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-125.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism Symposium.W. V. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60:20.

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Citations of this work BETA

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