New inconsistencies in infinite utilitarianism: Is every world good, bad or neutral?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):178 – 190 (2002)
Abstract
In the context of worlds with infinitely many bearers of utility, we argue that several collections of natural Utilitarian principles--principles which are certainly true in the classical finite Utilitarian context and which any Utilitarian would find appealing--are inconsistent.
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