Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence

Abstract
Several theorists (Merricks, Westphal, and McCall) have recently claimed to offer a novel way to respond to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, rooted in Molina's insight that God's beliefs depend on what we do, rather than the other way around. In this paper we argue that these responses either beg the question, or else are dressed-up versions of Ockhamism.
Keywords Foreknowledge  Omniscience  free will  Ockhamism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00606.x
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References found in this work BETA
Trenton Merricks (2009). Truth and Freedom. Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.

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Citations of this work BETA
Derek Baker (2015). Deliberators Must Be Imperfect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):321-347.
Neal A. Tognazzini (2015). Grounding the Luck Objection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):127-138.
Philip Swenson (2016). Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
T. Ryan Byerly (2014). Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):137-154.

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