The Cards that are Dealt You

The Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2):107-129 (2006)
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Abstract

Various philosophers have argued that in order to be morally responsible, we need to be the "ultimate sources'' of our choices and behavior. Although there are different versions of this sort of argument, I identify a "picture'' that lies behind them, and I contend that this picture is misleading. Joel Feinberg helpfully suggested that we scale down what might initially be thought to be legitimate demands on "self-creation,'' rather than jettison the idea that we are truly and robustly responsible. I follow Feinberg in rejecting various "inflated'' demands on "origination,'' "initiation,'' or ultimate sourcehood.

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John Fischer
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Free Will and Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2022 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), A Companion to Free Will. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 378-392.
Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.
A new puppet puzzle.Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):202-213.
Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.

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