The evil of death and the Lucretian symmetry: a reply to Feldman

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):783-789 (2013)
In previous work we have defended the deprivation account of death’s badness against worries stemming from the Lucretian point that prenatal and posthumous nonexistence are deprivations of the same sort. In a recent article in this journal, Fred Feldman has offered an insightful critique of our Parfitian strategy for defending the deprivation account of death’s badness. Here we adjust, clarify, and defend our strategy for reply to Lucretian worries on behalf of the deprivation account
Keywords Death  Badness  Lucretius  Mirror-image argument  Prenatal nonexistence  Posthumous nonexistence  Fred Feldman  Thomas Nagel  Deprivation
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9845-8
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Thomas Nagel (1970). Death. Noûs 4 (1):73-80.

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