Van Inwagen on free will

Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):252-260 (1986)
I discuss van inwagen's "first formal argument" for the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise. I distinguish different interpretations of the important notion, "s can render p false." I argue that on none of these interpretations is the argument clearly sound. I point to gaps in the argument, Although I do not claim that it is unsound
Keywords Determinism  Free Will  Freedom  Metaphysics  Van Inwagen, P
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DOI 10.2307/2219772
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Molinists Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.
On What We Can Ensure.Benjamin Schnieder - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):101 - 115.
The Ability to Render Something False.Benjamin Schnieder - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):295-303.

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