Bayesian confirmation and auxiliary hypotheses revisited: A reply to Strevens

Abstract
has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. Some background on Quine–Duhem Strevens's simplifying idealization Indications that (I) oversimplifies Q–D Strevens's argument for the legitimacy of (I).
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axi117
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,756
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Fitch's Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149 - 182.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

103 ( #49,506 of 2,177,988 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #317,698 of 2,177,988 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums