Bayesian confirmation and auxiliary hypotheses revisited: A reply to Strevens

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302 (2005)
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Abstract

has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. Some background on Quine–Duhem Strevens's simplifying idealization Indications that (I) oversimplifies Q–D Strevens's argument for the legitimacy of (I).

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

Citations of this work

Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman.Michael Strevens - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):913-918.

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References found in this work

Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison

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