Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):333-338 (2007)
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Abstract

By and large, we think is a useful reply to our original critique of his article on the Quine–Duhem problem. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply. Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD.

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

References found in this work

Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
The bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses.Michael Strevens - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.
Degree of confirmation.Karl R. Popper - 1954 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 5 (18):143-149.
Degree of Confirmation.Karl R. Popper - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):304-305.

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