Chalmers on the objects of credence

Philosophical Studies 170 (2):343-358 (2014)
Authors
Jesse Fitts
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Abstract
Chalmers (Mind 120(479): 587–636, 2011a) presents an argument against “referentialism” (and for his own view) that employs Bayesianism. He aims to make progress in a debate over the objects of belief, which seems to be at a standstill between referentialists and non-referentialists. Chalmers’ argument, in sketch, is that Bayesianism is incompatible with referentialism, and natural attempts to salvage the theory, Chalmers contends, requires giving up referentialism. Given the power and success of Bayesianism, the incompatibility is prima facie evidence against referentialism. In this paper, I review Chalmers’ arguments and give some responses on behalf of the referentialist
Keywords Bayesianism  Frege's puzzle  Propositions
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0223-6
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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