Authors
Melvin Fitting
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
Several justification logics have evolved, starting with the logicLP, (Artemov 2001). These can be thought of as explicit versions of modal logics, or logics of knowledge or belief, in which the unanalyzed necessity (knowledge, belief) operator has been replaced with a family of explicit justification terms. Modal logics come in various strengths. For their corresponding justification logics, differing strength is reflected in different vocabularies. What we show here is that for justification logics corresponding to modal logics extending T, various familiar extensions are actually conservative with respect to each other. Our method of proof is very simple, and general enough to handle several justification logics not directly corresponding to distinct modal logics. Our methods do not, however, allow us to prove comparable results for justification logics corresponding to modal logics that do not extend T. That is, we are able to handle explicit logics of knowledge, but not explicit logics of belief. This remains open.
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Conservativity for Logics of Justified Belief: Two Approaches.Robert S. Milnikel - 2012 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (7):809-819.

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