The talk is mainly defensive. I won’t oﬀer positive accounts of the “paradoxical” cases I will discuss (but, see “Extras”). I’ll begin with Harman’s defense of classical deductive logic against certain (epistemological) “relevantist” arguments
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
An Epistemic Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction.Rosemarie Rheinwald - 1993 - Synthese 95 (1):55 - 76.
An Unnoticed Flaw in Barker and Achinstein's Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction.Edward S. Shirley - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):611-617.
The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction.John D. Norton - unknown
Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction.Robert Kowalenko - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
Why There Need Not Be Any Grue Problem About Inductive Inference as Such.Stephen Hetherington - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (1):127-136.
Added to index2011-06-22
Total downloads62 ( #82,407 of 2,154,065 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #184,428 of 2,154,065 )
How can I increase my downloads?