Harman  would concede that (1)–(3) are inconsistent, and (as a result) that something is wrong with premises (1)–(3). But, he would reject the relevantists’ diagnosis that (1) must be rejected. I take it he’d say it’s (2) that is to blame here. (2) is a bridge principle  linking entailment and inference. (2) is correct only for consistent B’s. [Even if B is consistent, the correct response may rather be to reject some Bi’s in B.].
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