Synthese 156 (3):473-489 (2007)

Authors
Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University
Abstract
Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a "middle way" between Likelihoodism and Bayesianism. In the process, I will propose some new work for an old probability puzzle: the "Monty Hall" problem
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9134-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,975
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures.Vincenzo Crupi, Nick Chater & Katya Tentori - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):189-204.
Dwindling Confirmation.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):114-137.

View all 46 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Ratio Measures of Confirmation: Critical Remarks on Zalabardo’s Argument for the Likelihood-Ratio Measure.Valeriano Iranzo & Ignacio Martínez de Lejarza - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):193-200.
Mathematics, Science, and Confirmation Theory.Christopher Pincock - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):959-970.
Bayesianism and Simplicity.Ben Escoto - 2004 - Dissertation, Stanford University
Does the Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation Really Support Bayesianism?Brian Laetz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):39-46.
The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
Bayesianism and Irrelevant Conjunction.Patrick Maher - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):515-520.
Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332.
Did Tom Kuhn Actually Meet Tom Bayes?Lefteris Farmakis - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):41 - 53.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
168 ( #68,684 of 2,498,262 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #426,910 of 2,498,262 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes