Many-valued modal logics II

Abstract
Suppose there are several experts, with some dominating others (expert A dominates expert B if B says something is true whenever A says it is). Suppose, further, that each of the experts has his or her own view of what is possible — in other words each of the experts has their own Kripke model in mind (subject, of course, to the dominance relation that may hold between experts). How will they assign truth values to sentences in a common modal language, and on what sentences will they agree? This problem can be reformulated as one about many-valued Kripke models, allowing many-valued accessibility relations. This is a natural generalization of conventional Kripke models that has only recently been looked at. The equivalence between the many-valued version and the multiple expert one will be formally established. Finally we will axiomatize many-valued modal logics, and sketch a proof of completeness.
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Standard Gödel Modal Logics.Xavier Caicedo & Ricardo O. Rodriguez - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (2):189-214.
How True It is = Who Says It's True.Melvin Fitting - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (3):335 - 366.
How True It Is = Who Says It’s True.Melvin Fitting - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (3):335-366.

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