Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190 (2014)

Authors
Simon Fitzpatrick
John Carroll University
Abstract
This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.
Keywords Moral realism  Moral disagreement  Moral psychology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/05568641.2014.932953
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Faultless Moral Disagreement.Alison Hills - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):410-427.
Defending Moral Realism From Empirical Evidence of Disagreement.C. D. Meyers - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (3):373-396.
The Moral Significance of Moral Realism.Torbjörn Tännsjö - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):247-261.
Moral Conversion Without Moral Realism.Bruce N. Waller - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):129-137.
Do Moral Explanations Matter?Charles Sayward - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
Devitt on Moral Realism.Boran Berčić - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):63-68.
Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement.Folke Tersman - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):359-365.
Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere.Folke Tersman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):55-72.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-02-09

Total views
1,085 ( #4,540 of 2,448,078 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
83 ( #7,229 of 2,448,078 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes