Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190 (2014)
This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.
|Keywords||Moral realism Moral disagreement Moral psychology|
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References found in this work BETA
How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics.Norman Daniels - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (5):256-282.
The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value.Robert Audi - 2004 - Princeton Up.
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