On Kripke and statements

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):295–308 (2004)
I will focus on what seems to be a problem for Kripke’s position with respect to certain necessary a posteriori truths and true negative existentials. I shall tentatively suggest that within Kripke’s work a solution to the problem in question can be found provided one is willing to distinguish statements from propositions
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2004.00097.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,674
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
G. W. Fitch (1976). Are There Necessary a Posteriori Truths? Philosophical Studies 30 (4):243 - 247.
G. W. Fitch (1993). Non Denoting. Philosophical Perspectives 7:461-486.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

87 ( #54,607 of 1,903,117 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #219,659 of 1,903,117 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  is 1 thread in this forum
In 1976 Fitch proposed a tight argument against Kripkean a posteriori necessary truths. He argued that if 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are rigid designators with no descriptive content, then 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' and 'Phosphorus is Phosphorus' express the same proposition, one we can know a priori.

In this 2004 paper he tries to rescue Kripke's position by adding a new kind of entities in addition to sentences and propositions, namely, statements. He writes on p. 302:

"A statement is an interpreted sentence (type). The difference, for example, between the sentence “You are a philosopher” and the statement that you are a philosopher is that the former is uninterpreted and could mean (in some language) any number of things. The statement expressed by our use of the sentence given our interpretation according to the rules of our language is something like the indicated person has the property of being a philosopher. The proposition asserted by the utterance of the sentence in a given cont ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/3276 Reply