Authors
Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University
Abstract
Arguments for probabilism aim to undergird/motivate a synchronic probabilistic coherence norm for partial beliefs. Standard arguments for probabilism are all of the form: An agent S has a non-probabilistic partial belief function b iff (⇐⇒) S has some “bad” property B (in virtue of the fact that their p.b.f. b has a certain kind of formal property F). These arguments rest on Theorems (⇒) and Converse Theorems (⇐): b is non-Pr ⇐⇒ b has formal property F.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,192
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
The Right Thing to Believe.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 123-139.
Partial Character and the Language of Thought.Stephen L. White - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (4):347-65.
'Partial Defeaters' and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):355-372.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-05-13

Total views
139 ( #84,111 of 2,507,510 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,626 of 2,507,510 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes