Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622 (2002)
Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X—even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunction H & X less strongly than E confirms H (again, in the case of deductive evidence). I argue that existing Bayesian “resolutions” of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. In the end, I suggest a new‐and‐improved Bayesian account (and understanding) of the problem of irrelevant conjunction.
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Citations of this work BETA
The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):473-489.
State of the Field: Measuring Information and Confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.
Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle.Daniel Steel - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):53-77.
Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.Jan Sprenger - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw016.
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