The paradox of confirmation

Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113 (2006)
Abstract
Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain how this inconsistency affects the historical dialectic about the paradox and how it illuminates the nature of confirmation. In the end, we will argue that Hempel’s intuitions about the paradox of confirmation were (basically) correct, and that it is his theory that should be rejected, in favor of a (broadly) Bayesian account of confirmation.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00011.x
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References found in this work BETA
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.

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Citations of this work BETA
Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332.
Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.
Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
Hempel's Paradox, Law-Likeness and Causal Relations.Severin Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (3):244-263.

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Hempel's Paradox, Law-Likeness and Causal Relations.Severin Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (3):244-263.
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Confirmation, Paradox, and Logic.Leif Eriksen - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):681-687.
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