Two Sorts of Constitutivism

Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):1-20 (2019)
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Abstract

Some things, but only some things, are by nature subject to standards. Why? I explain and develop what I call nature-first constitutivism, which says that what something is determines what it should be. Nature is the basis of normativity. I explain this view in terms of a unique type of property which particulars of a genus can lack even though those properties partially determines the nature of the genus. Such properties partially describe the nature of a genus and are thereby normative for the particulars of that genus. Particulars of genera with such essential properties are by nature subject to standards with respect to those properties. Particulars of genera without such properties are not by nature subject to standards.

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Jeremy David Fix
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

The Error Condition.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):34-48.
The Instrumental Rule.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):444-462.
The simple constitutivist move.Luca Ferrero - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):146-162.
The Unity of Normative Thought.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):639-658.
Practical cognition as volition.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1077-1091.

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References found in this work

Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.
Real Definition.Gideon Rosen - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (3):189-209.
Metaphysical Rationalism.Shamik Dasgupta - 2014 - Noûs 50 (2):379-418.

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