Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law?

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2):159-197 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Instead of the question, ‘do we have an obligation to obey the law?,’ we should first ask the more modest question, ‘do we have reasons to obey the law?’ This paper offers a new account of the notion of the content-independence of legal reasons in terms of the grounding relation. That account is then used to mount a defense of the claim that we do indeed have content-independent moral reasons to obey the law (because it is the law), and that these reasons, very plausibly, often amount to an obligation to so act.


Added to PP

1,424 (#8,572)

6 months
248 (#12,296)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Edmund Tweedy Flanigan
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. qnew York: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.
Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy.Niko Kolodny - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (4):287-336.

View all 23 references / Add more references