Abstract

The question of the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics is a continuing one. In the last few decades the idea that Hegel even has a metaphysics has been challenged. Recently Stephen Houlgate has responded to this latter idea and tried to show not only that Hegel has a metaphysics, but of what sort it is. In my view Houlgate is right about Hegel having a metaphysics and also right generally about what sort of metaphysics it is. However, it seems to me that he has made too weak a case for the metaphysics in his presentation of what he takes to be Hegel’s arguments, and as a consequence cannot escape a charge that Hegel might still be either a Kantian or some sort of subjective idealist. What I mean by this is that, to the extent that we are simply limited in our metaphysics to what we can think being to be, there may still be an absolute other which we simply cannot know. Houlgate has made things very clear concerning the conclusion to which we should come about the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics, but has not, in my view, made his argument leading to his conclusions quite strong enough.