Philo 15 (1):19-37 (2012)

Abstract
In many of his addresses and debates, William Lane Craig has defended a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation (DCT). In a recent article and subsequent monograph, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticized Craig’s position.1 Armstrong contended that a DCT is subject to several devastating objections and further contended that even if theism is true a particular form of ethical naturalism is a more plausible account of the nature of moral obligations than a DCT is. This paper critiques Armstrong’s argument. I will argue Armstrong’s objections do not refute a DCT and the ethical naturalism he defends is not more plausible than Craig’s ethical supernaturalism
Keywords Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI 10.5840/Philo20121512
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Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1979 - Journal of Religious Ethics 7 (1):66 - 79.
Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.William Alston - 1990 - In M. Beaty (ed.), Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 303--326.
Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1979 - In C. F. Delaney (ed.), Rationality and Religious Belief. University of Notre Dame Press.
God and the Moral Order.C. Stephen Layman - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):304-316.

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