Abstract

This thesis presents a philosophical critique of the new science of sociobiology as it applies to human social behaviour. In particular, the early work of Edward O. Wilson is subjected to a sustained analysis in order to determine the extent to which certain philosophical presuppositions have affected his estimation of the explanatory power of sociobiology. It is argued that an ill-founded faith in "scientific materialism" lies behind Wilson's claim that sociobiology presents a serious challenge to the social sciences and humanities, and that in practice, sociobiology is little more than a return to an extreme form of biological reductionism which is inherently limited. It is further maintained that Wilson fails to see the inherent limitations in his approach because, while at the theoretical level he is willing to allow for the existence of emergent properties and holistic forms of analysis, at the practical level he refuses to entertain any but those explanations of human social behaviour given in terms of their genetic and evolutionary significance. Moreover, it is argued that the evidence Wilson presents in support of his interpretation of various types of human social behaviour is inconclusive and equally supports interpretations diametrically opposed to Wilson's own. Finally, it is suggested that when seen in its proper context, sociobiology holds the promise of providing novel insights into the origins of certain forms of human behaviour, but that it does not warrant the degree of importance Wilson and his followers have attributed to it