On Interrogative Inquiries Without Suspended Judgement and Doxastic Neutrality

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Abstract

It is a widespread idea that suspended judgement implies a state of doxastic neutrality. Jane Friedman has recently claimed that while inquiring into a given question, one suspends one’s judgement on it. Jointly considered, the previous claims imply that one is in a state of doxastic neutrality about a given question while inquiring into it. In this article, I explore the leading cases against Friedman’s perspective, arguing that it is debatable whether they exhibit inquiries into questions without doxastic neutrality. However, I will propose the possibility of “explorative disconfirmation inquiries” to show that doxastically non-neutral inquiries do exist.

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Leonardo Flamini
University of Pavia - University of Zurich (Alumnus)

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References found in this work

Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - 2024 - Episteme 21 (2):644-667.
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):298-312.

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