European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (3) (2021)
Abstract: Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics. The objection that DCM "has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible". This article criticizes Wielenberg's argument. Section 1 will expound Wielenberg's new "psychopath" argument in the context of the recent debate over the Promulgation Objection. Section 2 will discuss two ambiguities in the argument; in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous between whether Wielenberg uses the word "obligation" in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 will argue that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that that psychopaths "have no moral obligations". By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that Divine command theorists are committed to denying psychopaths have obligations.
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References found in this work
Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.Erik Joseph Wielenberg - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
The Theory of Morality.Alan Donagan - 1982 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1):48-50.