Hypatia 20 (3):115-126 (2005)
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: Judgment -- Moral and ethical aspects. The application of "thick" ethical concepts is best understood as a process of reflective rather than deductive judgment. Taking the form "B is as X as A," where X is a thick ethical concept and A and B are narrative wholes unified through X (for example, "Those who hid Jews from the Nazis were as brave as Achilles"), reflective judgment opens thick ethical concepts to transformation. Though interpretive, such reflective judgment may still be able to provide validity without recourse to "thin," purportedly context-neutral terms
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DOI | 10.1353/hyp.2005.0103 |
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Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy,.Hannah Arendt & Ronald Beiner - 1982 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 56 (2):386-386.
Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy.Michele M. Moody-Adams - 1997 - Harvard University Press.
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