Assessing risky social situations

Abstract

This paper re-examines the welfare economics of risk. It singles out a class of criteria, the “expected equally-distributed equivalent”, as the unique class which avoids serious drawbacks of existing approaches. Such criteria behave like ex-post criteria when the final statistical distribution of wellbeing is known ex ante, and like ex-ante criteria when risk generates no inequality. The paper also provides a new result on the tension between inequality aversion and respect of individual ex ante preferences, in the vein of Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,931

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-25

Downloads
82 (#209,040)

6 months
10 (#308,281)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Ethics 129 (2):309-343.
Decision under normative uncertainty.Franz Dietrich & Brian Jabarian - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (3):372-394.
Prioritarianism: A response to critics.Matthew D. Adler & Nils Holtug - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (2):101-144.
The Sure-Thing Principle.Jean Baccelli & Lorenz Hartmann - 2023 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 109 (102915).

View all 30 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare.Marc Fleurbaey - 2008 - Oxford University Press. Edited by M. Fleurbaey.
Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle.Philippe Mongin - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):511-532.

View all 7 references / Add more references