How to endorse conciliationism

Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that recognizing a distinct doxastic attitude called endorsement, along with the epistemic norms governing it, solves the self-undermining problem for conciliationism about disagreement. I provide a novel account of how the self-undermining problem works by pointing out the auxiliary assumptions the objection relies on. These assumptions include commitment to certain epistemic principles linking belief in a theory to following prescriptions of that theory. I then argue that we have independent reason to recognize the attitude of endorsement. Endorsement is the attitude of resilient and committed advocacy which is appropriate for researchers to have toward their own theory. Recognizing the importance of endorsement, and of its resiliency, gives us reason to deny the epistemic principles that serve as auxiliary assumptions in the self-undermining objection. This defuses the objection, and provides additional support for the theory of endorsement.

Similar books and articles

Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary.Simon Blessenohl - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):1-22.
Resolute conciliationism.John Pittard - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):442-463.
Religious Disagreement and Divine Hiddenness.Jon Matheson - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):215-225.
Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 77.
Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.
Conciliationism and Uniqueness.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.
Conciliationism without uniqueness.Matthew Lee - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):161-188.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-06-02

Downloads
664 (#17,258)

6 months
193 (#5,280)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Will Fleisher
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

Publishing without (some) belief.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):237-246.
Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1343-1371.
Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 97 references / Add more references