Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939 (2021)
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Abstract |
I argue that recognizing a distinct doxastic attitude called endorsement, along with the epistemic norms governing it, solves the self-undermining problem for conciliationism about disagreement. I provide a novel account of how the self-undermining problem works by pointing out the auxiliary assumptions the objection relies on. These assumptions include commitment to certain epistemic principles linking belief in a theory to following prescriptions of that theory. I then argue that we have independent reason to recognize the attitude of endorsement. Endorsement is the attitude of resilient and committed advocacy which is appropriate for researchers to have toward their own theory. Recognizing the importance of endorsement, and of its resiliency, gives us reason to deny the epistemic principles that serve as auxiliary assumptions in the self-undermining objection. This defuses the objection, and provides additional support for the theory of endorsement.
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Keywords | Epistemology Disagreement Social epistemology Self-undermining Conciliationism Metaphilosophy |
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Reprint years | 2021 |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1007/s11229-020-02695-z |
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References found in this work BETA
Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino (ed.) - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Publishing Without (Some) Belief.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):237-246.
Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.
Conciliatory Reasoning, Self-Defeat, and Abstract Argumentation.Aleks Knoks - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-48.
Problems with Publishing Philosophical Claims We Don’T Believe.Işık Sarıhan - forthcoming - Episteme:1-10.
View all 9 citations / Add more citations
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