Dialogue 39 (3):557-578 (2000)

Authors
Michael Fleming
University of British Columbia
Abstract
RÉSUMÉ: Une thèse sousjacente au présent article est que la reconnaissance de notre capacité à mal représenter le monde devrait jouer un rôle significatif dans les explications de la genèse de la connaissance empirique. Je recours à cette contrainte explicative pour évaluer le tableau proposé par John McDowell dans Mind and World et, en particulier, ses arguments contre l’idée que le contenu de l’expérience est non conceptuel. McDowell considère Gareth Evans comme un représentant de cette conception et soutient que le contenu de toute expérience est conceptuel. Je soutiens, pour ma part, que l’approche de McDowell est inadéquate parce qu’elle ne permet pas de rendre compte de notre capacité à mal représenter le monde.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 0012-2173
DOI dialogue200039358
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