Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:45-73. (2016)

Authors
Guy Fletcher
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
It is commonly claimed that reliance upon moral testimony is problematic in a way not common to reliance upon non-moral testimony. This chapter provides a new explanation of what the problem consists in—one that enjoys advantages over the most widely accepted explanation in the extant literature. The main theses of the chapter are as follows: that many forms of normative deference beyond the moral are problematic, that there is a common explanation of the problem with all of these forms of deference—an explanation that is based on the connection between the relevant judgments and desire-like attitudes, and that this explanation is compatible with moral realism.
Keywords moral testimony, moral realism, non-cognitivism, aesthetic judgments, normative judgments, prudential judgments, moral worth
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DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0003
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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation.Alison Hills - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):399-414.
A Defense of the Very Idea of Moral Deference Pessimism.Max Lewis - 2020 - Philosophical Studies (8):2323-2340.
Why Don't We Trust Moral Testimony?James Andow - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (4):456-474.
Practical Oomph: A Case for Subjectivism.Matthew Bedke - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):657-677.

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