In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-192 (2018)

Authors
Guy Fletcher
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Claims about needs are a ubiquitous feature of everyday practical discourse. It is therefore unsurprising that needs have long been a topic of interest in moral philosophy, applied ethics, and political philosophy. Philosophers have devoted much time and energy to developing theories of the nature of human needs and the like. Philosophers working on needs are typically committed to the idea that there are different kinds of needs and that within the different kinds of needs is a privileged class of needs that is especially normatively significant. Some philosophers go further and make rather grand claims about needs. They claim that needs are central or fundamental to moral thinking and that we must have a needs-centred moral theory or a general reorientation of moral philosophy around needs. In this paper I aim to do two things. First, to show how applying recent work on modal terms can help us to understand thought and talk about needs. This is the positive part. I then use these ideas to cast doubt on the more ambitious claims about needs. Put briefly, a proper understanding of claims about needs undermines the idea that the concept of needs is fundamental in moral thought or in moral philosophy. Ambitious needs theory fails.
Keywords modality  needs  moral philosophy
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.
Ought, Agents, and Actions.M. Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.

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Citations of this work BETA

An Analysis of the Notion of Need for the Representation of Public Services.Luca Biccheri & Roberta Ferrario - 2019 - JOWO 2019 - The Joint Ontology Workshops, Proceedings of the Joint Ontology Workshops 2019, Episode 5: The Styrian Autumn of Ontology, Graz, Austria, September 23-25, 2019.

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