In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 148-160 (2016)

Authors
Guy Fletcher
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
This chapter is divided into three parts. First I outline what makes something an objective list theory of well-being. I then go on to look at the motivations for holding such a view before turning to objections to these theories of well-being.
Keywords objective list theory  objective accounts of well-being  desire
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Are Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3):209-234.
A Perfectionist Basic Structure.Avigail Ferdman - 2019 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 45 (7):1-21.
Lopsided Lives.Theron Pummer - 2017 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296.

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