Stopping rules as experimental design

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):1-20 (2019)
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Abstract

A “stopping rule” in a sequential experiment is a rule or procedure for deciding when that experiment should end. Accordingly, the “stopping rule principle” states that, in a sequential experiment, the evidential relationship between the final data and an hypothesis under consideration does not depend on the experiment’s stopping rule: the same data should yield the same evidence, regardless of which stopping rule was used. In this essay, I reconstruct and rebut five independent arguments for the SRP. Reminding oneself that the stopping rule is a part of an experiment’s design and is no more mysterious than many other design aspects helps elucidate why some of these arguments for the SRP are unsound.

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Samuel C. Fletcher
University of Minnesota

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Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2006 - Philosophy Compass.
Does “Ought” Imply “Feasible”?Nicholas Southwood - 2016 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (1):7-45.

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