Synthese 194 (8):2973–3003 (2017)
AbstractVirtue epistemology has been divided into two camps: reliabilists and responsibilists. This division has been attributed in part to a focus on different types of virtues, viz., faculty virtues and character virtues. I will argue that this distinction is unhelpful, and that we should carve up the theoretical terrain differently. Making several better distinctions among virtues will show us two important things. First, that responsibilists and reliabilists are actually engaged in different, complementary projects; and second, that certain responsibilist critiques of reliabilism miss the mark. With these distinctions on the table, we can see that the virtue reliabilist project is in some ways more fundamental than the responsibilist project, since the latter importantly depends on the former. I argue that the distinctively epistemic value of the responsibilist’s character virtues is derived from their connections to the reliabilist’s constitutive virtues. While this will give us a unified account of the epistemic value of intellectual virtues, it is not a reduction of the responsibilist project to the reliabilist one; rather, it as a way of securing the separate importance of each project by clarifying how they relate to one another
Similar books and articles
Character, reliability and virtue epistemology.Jason Baehr - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212.
Expanding The Situationist Challenge To Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology.Mark Alfano - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):223-249.
The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology.Jason Baehr - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The epistemically virtuous clinician.James A. Marcum - 2009 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (3):249-265.
Virtues of inquiry and the limits of reliabilism.George Streeter - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):117 – 128.
Xunzi and Virtue Epistemology.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2014 - Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture 41 (3):121-142.
Virtues as Skills in Virtue Epistemology.Matt Stichter - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:333-348.
The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues.Sarah Wright - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):91-112.
Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology.Jason S. Baehr (ed.) - 2015 - New York: Routledge.
Was Sir William Crookes epistemically virtuous?Ian James Kidd - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 48:67-74.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
When Evidence Isn’t Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology.Lisa Miracchi - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):413-437.
The Platonic conception of intellectual virtues: its significance for virtue epistemology.Alkis Kotsonis - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2045-2060.
References found in this work
What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.
Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity.John Greco - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
A Virtue Epistemology: Volume I: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.