Synthese 194 (8):2973–3003 (2017)

Authors
Will Fleisher
Northeastern University
Abstract
Virtue epistemology has been divided into two camps: reliabilists and responsibilists. This division has been attributed in part to a focus on different types of virtues, viz., faculty virtues and character virtues. I will argue that this distinction is unhelpful, and that we should carve up the theoretical terrain differently. Making several better distinctions among virtues will show us two important things. First, that responsibilists and reliabilists are actually engaged in different, complementary projects; and second, that certain responsibilist critiques of reliabilism miss the mark. With these distinctions on the table, we can see that the virtue reliabilist project is in some ways more fundamental than the responsibilist project, since the latter importantly depends on the former. I argue that the distinctively epistemic value of the responsibilist’s character virtues is derived from their connections to the reliabilist’s constitutive virtues. While this will give us a unified account of the epistemic value of intellectual virtues, it is not a reduction of the responsibilist project to the reliabilist one; rather, it as a way of securing the separate importance of each project by clarifying how they relate to one another
Keywords Epistemology  Virtue epistemology  Reliabilism  Responsibilism  Virtues  Competence
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Reprint years 2017
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1084-2
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
The Virtue of Curiosity.Lewis Ross - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):105-120.
Knowledge Is All You Need.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):353-378.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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