Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception

Authors
Dagfinn Føllesdal
University of Oslo
Abstract
The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl's notion of hyle, whose role in Husserl's theory of perception is briefly sketched.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/gps1978522
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Citations of this work BETA

Gödel's Program Revisited Part I: The Turn to Phenomenology.Kai Hauser - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):529-590.
Content and Context of Perception.David Woodruff Smith - 1984 - Synthese 61 (October):61-88.
Noemata and Their Formalization.Wojciech Krysztofiak - 1995 - Synthese 105 (1):53 - 86.
To the Nothingnesses Themselves: Husserl’s Influence on Sartre’s Notion of Nothingness.Simon Gusman - 2018 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 49 (1):55-70.

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