Synthese 19 (1-2):147 - 157 (1968)
AbstractAn appraisal of the current status of the modalities and of quine's arguments against them. The author accepts "quine's thesis," that one cannot quantify into referentially opaque contexts, And argues that nobody has succeeded in making sense of such quantification. However, It is shown that modal constructions, Being constructions on general terms and sentences, Can be referentially transparent and extensionally opaque and that consequently the collapse of modal distinctions warned against by quine in "word and object" can be avoided. This combination of referential transparency and extensional opacity is just what quine means by essentialism, And the author therefore agrees with quine that quantified modal logic commits one to essentialism
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Quinus ab Omni Nævo Vindicatus.John P. Burgess - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):25-65.
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