A defence of informational structural realism

Synthese 161 (2):219 - 253 (2008)
Authors
Luciano Floridi
Oxford University
Abstract
This is the revised version of an invited keynote lecture delivered at the 1st Australian Computing and Philosophy Conference (CAP@AU; the Australian National University in Canberra, 31 October–2 November, 2003). The paper is divided into two parts. The first part defends an informational approach to structural realism. It does so in three steps. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable. It follows that a version of OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that a version of OSR is also plausible, because not all relata (structured entities) are logically prior to relations (structures). Third, it is shown that a version of OSR is also applicable to both sub-observable (unobservable and instrumentally-only observable) and observable entities, by developing its ontology of structural objects in terms of informational objects. The outcome is informational structural realism, a version of OSR supporting the ontological commitment to a view of the world as the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other. The paper has been discussed by several colleagues and, in the second half, ten objections that have been moved to the proposal are answered in order to clarify it further.
Keywords Epistemic structural realism  Informational ontology  Levels of abstraction  Ontic structural realism  Structural realism
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Reprint years 2008
DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9163-z
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References found in this work BETA

The Social Construction of What?Ian Hacking - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
What is Structural Realism?James Ladyman - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.
Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism.Michael Esfeld - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):179 – 194.
The Informational Nature of Personal Identity.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):549-566.
Against Digital Ontology.Luciano Floridi - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):151 - 178.

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