Epistemic Schmagency?

In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 289-310 (2018)

Abstract

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection.

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A. K. Flowerree
Texas Tech University

References found in this work

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Two Concepts of Rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.

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Citations of this work

The Simple Constitutivist Move.Luca Ferrero - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):146-162.

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