Epistemic Styles

Philosophical Topics 49 (2):35-55 (2021)
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Abstract

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists.

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2021-12-26

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Carolina Flores
University of California, Santa Cruz

Citations of this work

Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry.Paulina Sliwa - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):117-137.
Epistemic style in OCD.Carolina Flores - 2023 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 30 (2):147-150.

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References found in this work

Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world.Philip Kitcher - 1962 - In Philip Kitcher & Wesley C. Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation. Univ of Minnesota Pr. pp. 410-505.
Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy.Michael Hannon - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):591-611.

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