Authors
Luciano Floridi
Oxford University
Abstract
This article assesses’ Susan Haack’s theory of foundherentism and her position that this approach provides a solution to the meta-epistimeological problem. Using a Cartesian model, the paper shows the circularity of Haack’s arguments, ultimately arguing that a combination of foundherentism and an a priori strategy may provide a more fruitful approach.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr199656363
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