Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79 (2004)
The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p can be solved. In this paper, the coordination problem is proved to be insolvable by showing that it is equivalent to the ''''coordinated attack'''' problem, which is demonstrably insolvable in epistemic logic. It follows that the tripartite account is not merely inadequate as it stands, as proved by Gettier-type counterexamples, but demonstrably irreparable in principle, so that efforts to improve it can never succeed.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information.Luciano Floridi - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (4):554-582.
Information Closure and the Sceptical Objection.Luciano Floridi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1037-1050.
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