Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79 (2004)
AbstractThe tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p can be solved. In this paper, the coordination problem is proved to be insolvable by showing that it is equivalent to the ''''coordinated attack'''' problem, which is demonstrably insolvable in epistemic logic. It follows that the tripartite account is not merely inadequate as it stands, as proved by Gettier-type counterexamples, but demonstrably irreparable in principle, so that efforts to improve it can never succeed.
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References found in this work
Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
Citations of this work
Faultless Responsibility: On the Nature and Allocation of Moral Responsibility for Distributed Moral Actions.Luciano Floridi - 2016 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 374:20160112.
The Explanation Game: A Formal Framework for Interpretable Machine Learning.David S. Watson & Luciano Floridi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):1–32.
The Logic of Design as a Conceptual Logic of Information.Luciano Floridi - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (3):495-519.
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