Jurisprudence 8 (2):185-204 (2017)

Jonathan Floyd
Bristol University
This article examines the relationship between Raz's theories of practical reason and political morality. Raz believes the former underpins the latter, when in fact it undermines it. This is because three core features of his theory of practical reason – desires, goals, and competitive pluralism––combine in such a way as to undermine a core feature of his theory of political morality––what Raz calls our autonomy-based duty to provide everyone with what he takes to be an adequate range of valuable life options. As it turns out, if we are reasonable, in terms of the former theory, then we are likely to be immoral, in terms of the latter one.
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DOI 10.1080/20403313.2016.1164489
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References found in this work BETA

Three Themes From Raz.Green Leslie - 2005 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25 (3):503-523.
Liberal Theories of Multiculturalism.Will Kymlicka - 2017 - Post-Filosofie 2:51--75.

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Normative Behaviourism and Global Political Principles.Jonathan Floyd - 2016 - Journal of International Political Theory 12 (2):152-168.

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